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INTRODUCTION
In examining economic and political trends of the 1980's, the process of trimming down
unwieldy, inefficient public sectors has preoccupied political and economic planners across the
globe. Developing countries in particular have been forced to implement massive restructuring
of their economies in the face of a rapidly changing economic world order, with little tolerance
for inefficiency or waste. The need for economic rationalization is not surprising in light of the
rapid, unrestrained expansion of the public sector throughout the 1970's. Floundering, debt-laden
public enterprises have essentially outlived both their political and economic usefulness.
Privatization, in part, represents a backlash versus the excesses created by protection, subsidies,
and irrational non-economic objectives, which enabled the proliferation of uncompetitive
industries under the guise of national development.
By definition, privatization calls for a reduction of the role of the state while enhancing
the breadth of the private sector and accumulation of private ownership. Market forces rather
than political interference and protectionist policies determine profit and viability. Yet the text
book cases documenting this transformation within developed Western economies are often
inappropriate and inapplicable within lesser developed economies, still in the process of
industrialization. In many countries, economic efficiency and productivity have never been the
predominant, overriding goals of economic policy. This is particularly relevant within the
polities of Southeast Asia, where the line between political and economic activities is often
blurred, and policies are characterized by multiple, interwoven objectives. If political and social
objectives can be achieved in tandem with economic goals, all the better.
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Though attempts to create rationality and transparency in the economic sphere constitute
a current global trend in policy formulation, it is a unique process which cannot be removed from
its distinctive political, social, and historical environment. The development of public sector
expansion, followed by privatization, have each been perceived as timely necessary responses to
the changing economic order. Yet the rationale behind these changes in policy within Southeast
Asia, do not stop with economic justification. They often represent calculated political moves
to protect the perpetuation of ruling interests and the viability of a political system which
guarantees a disproportionate return to the ruling elites. In the 1980's, privatization represents
the most effective means of legitimizing political ownership and control, necessitated by an
altered international order where the old rules no longer apply. According to Indonesian
economist M. Hadi Soesastro in discussing economic liberalization in Indonesia, ultimately
"deregulation is a political process.....and as a political process, it defies rational explanation."1
The intricate politics of privatization have made its implementation far from rational or
transparent.
To understand the use of economic policy as a tool to complement and fulfill political
objectives in developing countries, it is constructive to focus on common patterns of change
which apply beyond the national boundaries of a single country. For the purpose of this study,
the politics of privatization will be examined within the confines of Malaysia and Indonesia, as
examples of trends progressing throughout the Asian region. As case studies, these two countries
1 M. Hadi Soesastro, "The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia", Asian Survey, vol. XXIX,
no. 9, September 1989, p. 863.
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provide ample ground for comparison in their respective paths of economic development and
rationalization by a political elite. By tracing the history of state involvement, the rise of the
public sector, and the evolution of key linkages between the bureaucracy, military and business
interests, the complex interplay of politics and economics is established as the motivating force
behind policy formulation. Richard Robison, in his book The Rise of Capitalism in Indonesia,
points to the state-owned corporate sector as the finch-pin of political dominance over the
Indonesian economy? Yet the conditions which set the stage for the effective use of public
enterprise as a political tool are far from static; the transformation of economic conditions in the
1980's has necessitated the implementation of structural change and a corresponding reworking
of the tools for maintaining political control and dominance.
The quadrupling of oil prices in the early 1970's impacted economic policy around the
world, particularly in developing countries with access to a sudden windfall in oil revenues. Any
incentive to curb growth without efficiency and correct protectionist economic policies was
effectively suppressed. As a result of the oil boom, foreign banks suddenly possessed large
reserves of petro dollars which they were eager to recycle in the form of loans. This, in tandem
with high inflation and low interest rates, fueled high borrowing throughout the developing
world. Indonesia used its loans primarily for infrastructure development in the natural resources
sector. The economy became increasingly dependent on oil revenues, accounting for, at its peak,
90% of government expenditures. The development of non-oil exports was ignored in favor of
2 Richard Robison, The Rise of Capitalism in Indonesia, (Sydney, Australia, Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1986),
p. 211.
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an import-substitution industrialization program dependent on government protection in the form
of tariffs and subsidies. A network of burdensome trade and investment regulations, coupled
with increased nationalist sentiment, prevented foreign investment from playing a more significant
role in the economy.
Malaysia borrowed heavily during this period in order to further nationalize its economy
and reduce the level of foreign ownership. The government bought up controlling shares in a
number of foreign firms, as part of its strategy for increasing Malay economic participation and
ownership. Prime Minister Mahatir introduced the "Look East" policy in the early 1980's, using
Japan as a model for heavy industrialization. This program required substantial financing through
borrowing, representing a break from Malaysia's traditionally conservative macroeconomic
management. In this environment, private sector expansion received little attention, as the role
of public enterprise continued to expand in key economic sectors.
Flamboyant borrowing and spending came to a halt with the debt crisis of the 1980's,
initiated by a host of international factors affecting loan repayment. The sudden drop in oil
prices, coupled with the recession of the mid-'80's, appreciation of the yen, and increased interest
rates did not bode well for countries bearing the escalating burden of debt payments. Due to the
drop in commodity and oil prices, and rising value of the dollar, export earnings were no longer
sufficient to cover these payments. These conditions fueled a sense of economic crisis which
enabled the implementation of drastic restructuring measures. In the case of Indonesia, it was
not until oil prices fell to $10 per barrel in 1986 that it became politically feasible to implement
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long debated reforms.' Deteriorating balance of payments provided the incentive for substantive
deregulation of the economy.
In the words of Indonesian economist M. Hadi Soesastro, there exists "no guide to the
proper sequencing of structural reforms in an opening (as distinct from an open) economy". Yet
both Malaysia and Indonesia did a remarkable job in rapidly responding to the economic
challenges of the 1980's. Rather than waiting for economic stabilization, they simultaneously
implemented restructuring measures to enhance economic efficiency, preserving financial stability
while promoting growth. Both implemented austerity measures to stimulate fiscal and monetary
contraction. Currencies were devalued and trade and investment laws were liberalized to attract
much needed foreign exchange. In Malaysia, the New Economic Policy was liberalized to allow
100% foreign ownership. The growth of direct foreign investment enabled a shift from debt to
foreign equity as the basis for promoting growth and development. Malaysia used this capital
to rapidly repay its debt. In Indonesia, a conscious effort was made to diversify the economy
away from oil exports; by 1988, revenues from non-oil exports increased from 10% in the early
'80s to 48%, a substantial shift. A world wide currency realignment enhanced the
competitiveness of exports on the world market and caused Japan and the NICs to look to
Southeast Asia for offshore production sites, to stem the rising costs at home.
3 Mari Pangestu, "Economic Policy Reforms in Indonesia", The Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, 1989,
p. 222.
a Soesastro, p. 854.
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It was not until access to funding from oil exports and loans was threatened, that a more
transparent, international economic approach became a necessity. The state's inability to continue
to finance and subsidize economic expansion led to the realization that increased efficiency within
the system was a prerequisite for continued growth. Reform became the obligatory response to
the altered economic environment of the 1980's. The implementation of restructuring measures
fostered rapid growth and provided a taste for the rewards of greater technocratic management
of the economy. Inefficient public sector enterprises heavily reliant on foreign borrowing and
plagued by operating deficits were an obvious target in the move to enhance productivity and
transparency. As traditional patronage and finance sources with both economic and political
objectives, their dismantlement posed a direct challenge to customary foundations of power and
the vested interests of the political elite. Left with few other viable alternatives, politico-
bureaucrats have had to adjust accordingly their sources of revenue and their tools for maintaining
political control within this new environment. Privatization represents one of these tools, and has
been used in both Malaysia and Indonesia to boost indigenous economic ownership and to
maintain the reigns of power in an environment where the old rules no longer apply.
A direct result of this economic transformation has been the growing predilection on the
part of governments to move toward privatization of key economic sectors to enhance efficiency
and competitiveness in an increasingly integrated world market. The process of privatization can
be implemented in a variety of forms, dependent on the role of the state, the goals of public
sector divesture, the impetus for structural change, and the existence of a developed indigenous
capitalist class capable of taking over from the state. The net results of this process have been
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the emergence of a unique form of privatization "Asian style". Rather than a significant removal
of state interference in the economy, Indonesia and Malaysia have experienced a transfer of
economic patronage from the state to decentralized power centers made up of political elites and
political parties. This transfer of ownership has been implemented cautiously, in an effort to
preserve the viability of the regime and its social and economic base. Rational technocratic
management of this transfer of ownership has been impeded and distorted when the business
interests of politico-bureaucrats have been threatened by change.
Inherent differences in the distribution of patronage are engendered by the structure of
the political system itself. In the democratic party system of Malaysia, it is the goal of the
political elites to protect the position and assets of the party to which they owe power, which
throughout the independence era has been the United Malay National Organization (UMNO).
In the authoritarian, military-dominated state of Indonesia, the goal is to protect the position and
assets of the ruler and military, and, as a political elite, create reciprocal patron-client ties which
will guarantee political access and favorable treatment. The rapid, expansive growth of
prominent corporate conglomerates and their respective nuclei of power is reflective of these
variant political systems.
The impact of the political system and its players on the restructuring of the public sector
must also take into consideration basic political motivations and underlying issues of legitimacy.
Funding of the political machine, entrenchment of political elites as indispensable players in the
accumulation of domestic capital, and the spread of the fruits of growth to a broader societal base
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all serve to enhance the long-term viability of those holding power. In both Indonesia and
Malaysia, legitimacy of the state has been augmented by outstanding economic growth rates
which have tempered public outcry versus the existence of political repression and economic
inequality. The state has fashioned itself as an agent of growth, promoting goals of national
development and bolstering the position of the indigenous Malay versus Chinese and foreign
interests. Continued economic growth in tandem with decreased formal state ownership was
targeted as an ideal answer to legitimation questions in the 1980's, brought to the forefront by
earlier economic crisis. Privatization provided an easily manipulated means to this end, and a
vehicle for initiating the reconstitution of the political power basis out of the presidential palace
and into the market place.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF THE STATE SECTOR
The complex interplay of factors affecting the rise of the public sector, the move toward
privatization, and the political rationale behind this transition, requires a review of historical
trends heralding the growth of state involvement in the economy. In both Indonesia and
Malaysia, the economic development paths followed in the early days of independence were
sharply influenced by their respective colonial experiences. The Dutch and the British used their
profitable bases in Southeast Asia to extract high value commodity exports for sale on the world
market. Their policies led to the creation of a dual economy, in which the modem export sector
was dominated by foreign nationals juxtaposed by a traditional economic sector of subsistence
agriculture, petty trade and handicraft production which remained the domain of the indigenous
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Malay population. A growing Chinese community, able to tap into an extensive overseas trading
network and capital base, developed as middlemen linking the modern foreign dominated
economic sector with the traditional rural economy.
The transformation to an export oriented, cash crop economy progressed along more
extreme lines under the Dutch in Indonesia than under the British in Malaysia. The Dutch relied
on traditional power relations, using indigenous channels of authority as a means for economic
extraction. This system resembled a form of dual, but not equal Dutch and native rule, in which
Dutch administrators and Javanese regents presided over the ruling of the regency. The regent's
authority was secured, yet his independence was lost to the Dutch.
The Dutch attempted to buttress the peasantry from the effects of rapid economic
modernization and the transition to a market economy, through maintenance of traditional pillars
of authority and culture. Yet the pressures of the new system permeated village life, as the rural
population was forced to abandon traditional modes of subsistence farming and the primary
cultivation of rice, in favor of growing foreign commercial crops with little use within a
subsistence economy.
The passage of the Agrarian Law of 1870 changed the complexion of colonial economic
policy in the Indies. The Agrarian Law effectively opened the islands to private capital and
enterprise, allowing the Dutch to lease government lands for up to 75 years, and Indonesian lands
for shorter periods. This paved the way for the development of large scale plantations, the growth
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of a cash crop economy and the use of foreign planters, capital, and labor.
This rapid evolution of a new social order contributed to the development of a plural
society. The gap was widened between the planter and the laborer, as human value was
increasingly measured in production terms. As the economic system was transformed from
indirect economic exploitation to one of directly administered free enterprise, traditional cultural
and political buffers were eroded, and the peasantry became increasingly vulnerable to world
market fluctuations. The peasantry's opposition to the colonial system had traditionally been
directed toward the proximate and visible symbols of colonial power, namely the Javanese
aristocracy and the Chinese. These symbols served to mitigate the degree of peasant animosity
vented toward the Dutch. These buffers eroded with the rise of the more invasive plantation
economy.
In addition to the agricultural sector, the Dutch established and invested in a number of
state enterprises, primarily in the public utilities domain including railways, postal services,
electricity generation and oil and natural gas exploration. These enterprises were nationalized
and subject to more centralized control under the Japanese during their occupation of Indonesia
during World War II. The close interaction between government and enterprise administration
provided a poor training ground for impressionable Indonesians, who were placed in managerial
positions for the first time under Japanese aegis. This early exposure to management of the
modem economic sector significantly influenced Indonesian predilections for a state guided
economy. Concepts of competition and production for profit were absent in the training process.
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Remnants of Japanese war time management practices are still visible today, as witnessed by the
perseverance of target orientation versus efficiency.
Not surprisingly, Marxist ideology found a receptive audience among the newly
emerging Indonesian elite, due to it's anti-imperialist content. Nationalist sentiment adopted far
more radical and revolutionary overtones as compared to the Malaysian case, reflective of their
diverse colonial experiences. Any attraction to capitalism and private enterprise was effectively
squelched in Indonesia due to its equation with colonial domination. Independence and capitalism
were viewed as contradictions in term, further intensified by the Dutch attempt to re-claim its
colony at the conclusion of WWII. Once independence was attained following a four year
struggle against the Dutch, the founders of the Republic of Indonesia were committed to using
state enterprise as the primary tool for rebuilding the economy, and embedded the state's
interventionist role in the Constitution of 1945. Article 33 states that the "branches of production
important for the State and of dominating interest to the livelihood of the masses of the people
have to be controlled by the State."' History has proved this article is open to broad
interpretation.
The British experience in Malaysia differed in several important respects, leaving in its
wake a distinct economic and political framework incorporated by the Malaysians at
5 Mohammad Sadli, "The Private and State Enterprise Sectors in Indonesia", Indonesian Quarterly, vol. XVI/2,
1988, p. 206.
6 Ibid, p. 210.
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independence. Malaya's colonial occupation was far shorter and less invasive than that of
Indonesia. The British exercised a light political hand, preserving the traditional ruling structure
of the sultanate though significantly reducing its political significance. The Malay peasantry was
intentionally buffered from the effects of a rapidly developing commercial economy, and
excluded from participation in the lucrative plantation and mining economy developed by the
British. While the peasantry maintained a traditional subsistence based economy, Chinese and
Indian contract laborers were imported to work in the tin mines and on the rubber estates,
forming the beginnings of an occupational specialization of the races which has persisted to this
day.
As in the case of Indonesia, a modem export sector existed side by side with the
traditional subsistence sector. Yet a careful network of paternalistic policies prevented the
erosion of buffers in Malaya, shielding the economic and social system of the peasantry and
protecting the legitimacy of the traditional aristocracy. Land reservations established by the
British to ensure Malay ownership, effectively tied the peasantry to the land and preserved
traditional rice growing patterns.
The development of commercial agriculture necessitated a shift from the traditional
pattern of usufructuory land rights to the institution of land tenure, placing the British in control
of land titles to be distributed in the name of the State government. This paved the way for the
development of commercial rubber plantations and an influx of foreign investors eager to
participate in the tremendous profits reaped on the world market.
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The Malay aristocracy was given a greater stake in the colonial apparatus than its
Indonesian counterpart through access to the civil service and administration. As the British
presence in Malaya expanded, the traditional elites were increasingly drawn into the colony's
administration, marking the beginnings of a longstanding alliance between the aristocrats and
administrators within the local community. From the beginning, this elite remained part of the
traditional political structure while simultaneously performing as civil servants. Malaysia's
political leadership would eventually emerge from this pool of English educated administrators,
with little concept of a politically neutral civil service.
Strong nationalist sentiment and revolutionary ideology targeted against the British, had
little grounds for establishing a foothold in Malaya. The British were welcomed back as
liberators, signaling the termination of a brutal Japanese occupation period. Independence,
though longer in the coming, was achieved peacefully through a series of gradual transfers of
authority, culminating in 1957. Rather than eschewing all vestiges of the colonial occupation,
as in Indonesia, the founders of an independent Malaysia were both confident and comfortable
with a British style bureaucracy and a capitalist economy. Predilections for state involvement
in the economy had, as it basis, a very different motivation and rationale. State manipulation of
the economy sought to correct the disadvantages suffered by the Malays as a result of British
paternalistic policies, which had hampered modern development.
As a result of the prevailing sentiment at the time of Indonesia's independence, the state
was poised for entrance into the economy as a substantial player. A strong sense of nationalism
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and a commitment to social objectives were incorporated into state ideology as legacies of the
colonial occupation. The framers of the new Republic sought to reconstruct a national economy
from a colonial past, using the political power of the state as a tool to alter the precedent of an
extractive economic system. It was never the intention of these early economic planners to
completely nationalize the Indonesian economy, but rather to incorporate a mixed formula,
relying on public enterprise as an "agent of development".
Indonesian economist Mohammad Sadli sketches a hierarchical political pyramid as
illustration of the colonial "status quo" the Republic's framers sought so fervently to place behind
them. The pyramid is dominated by western enterprise, followed below by Chinese merchants
and traders, who preside over the foundation of the pyramid, made up of the dominant
indigenous Indonesians. The leaders of independence sought to redress this hierarchical
imbalance, elevating the impotent majority through use of the state's assistance and protection.
Sadli goes on to say, "Before a genuine indigenous modern private sector can develop, the public
sector becomes the spearhead and bulwark of the emancipation process. "' As such, an initial
policy goal of Indonesia's state-led economy was to provide the necessary framework for private
sector growth and capital accumulation.
Richard Robison, in The Rise of Capital in Indonesia, gives further credit to this theory.
He points to the distinction that state capital in Indonesia did not emerge as a product of a
'Ibid, p. 208.
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socialist revolution versus a capitalist class, but rather as a component of a nationalist capitalist
revolution. State capital has not expropriated private capital, but has created the environment
necessary for its accumulation.' It filled the gap for an absent domestic capitalist class at the time
of independence.
In reviewing the pattern of state sector expansion in Indonesia, there are two identifiable
groups of state owned enterprises which came into existence at significant moments in history.
First, there were those established just after the formation of the republic, including the telephone
company Perumtel, electricity utility PLN, and airport and railway administrations, patterned
after the colonial model. The scope of the state sector remained small and ineffective during the
early days of the Sukarno regime due to political instability which prohibited economic growth
and gave rise to high inflation rates, low growth and investment, and alienation from the West.
The degree of state penetration of the economy and capital ownership increased markedly in the
late 1950's due to a political dispute with the Dutch over the status of West Irian. This
disagreement led to the nationalization of all remaining Dutch enterprise, primarily in the areas
of mining, plantations and foreign trade. This move was viewed by many as a necessary
component of the decolonization process, and created an overnight expansion of the size and
breadth of the Indonesian bureaucracy. Though the state's role in the economy is enshrined in
the constitution, some have postulated that this substantial expansion of the public sector was
largely an ad hoc response to the spoils produced by a political conflict. With the absence of an
e Robison, p. 212.
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indigenous capitalist class, the state had no choice but to fill the void and assume ownership.
During this same period, one of the most important and perhaps controversial state
enterprises was founded, with the incorporation of a cluster of defunct oil wells in North Sumatra
by a group of army officers into the national oil company Pertamina. With sole access to a vast
and increasingly valuable commodity, Pertamina became the primary producer of revenue and
foreign exchange earnings for the state. Rather than actually invest in the oil sector, Pertamina's
primary function was to manage the resource through the allocation of contracts and production
sharing arrangements with foreign investors. Protected by the Constitution which clearly states
that energy resources belong to the state, Pertamina was viewed as a vehicle for national
development based on extraction of a natural resource, and as such, was treated as an
inexhaustible commodity. It has been censured for becoming a "state within a state", possessing
a degree of independence which enabled it to defy state control of its operation and finances.
Degree of independence, lack of accountability and role as a provider of surplus funds to the
military have been standard criticisms directed at Indonesia's public sector.
Since the founding of the Republic, the state has consistently provided the greatest source
of domestic capital for investment and growth. As the only significant indigenous funding source
for large scale projects, the state also saw itself as a counterweight to Chinese and international
capital, playing upon the strong nationalist sentiment of the era. The state, in its attempts to alter
Chinese and foreign dominance of the economy provided protection and subsidies to indigenous
players, yet high rates of failure and misuse of funds made this policy less than effective. The
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focus of state capital was directed toward development of key economic sectors, particularly
natural resources and infrastructure projects, which were often unprofitable, providing no
immediate investment return and little appeal to outside investors. Another fundamental goal,
to create a self-sufficient industrial base to replace heavy reliance on commodity exports, began
with the state's production of cement, textiles, glass, and automobile assembly. Control of
strategic economic sectors would prove to be a valuable source of supplementary funds and
patronage for political and military leaders, and a tacit underpinning of the military's long term
involvement in the political arena.
The political and economic failures of the Sukarno era led to a crisis which destroyed
political support of a nationalist, state-led industrialization policy, stimulating a shift in economic
development strategy. The goal of national industrialization through sole reliance on state capital,
proved ineffective and short-sighted. The beginning of Suharto's New Order heralded the return
of international investors with the financial capacity to fuel Indonesia's transformation to an
industrialized economy. Confrontation with the West was dropped in favor of needed foreign
investment, loans and technology. Major state-funded industrial projects were discarded in favor
of production of ISI consumer goods. The emergence of laissez-faire policies was short-lived.
By the early 1970's the state began to play a more aggressive role in promoting and protecting
domestic capital and industry. Development of large scale national industry responsive to central
planning, able to take a risk and operate at a loss re-emerged, focusing on major resource
projects in the areas of natural gas, oil, steel and aluminum. In the early 1980's, Minister of
Industry Soehoed stated the key functions of the state owned corporation as follows:
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to develop vital sectors in which the capacity of private investors is limited; to participate
in important commodity ventures to stabilize prices; and to pioneer new sectors of
enterprise in which the risks for private enterprise are still too great.'
The renewed appeal of state-led, economic nationalism was significantly fueled by the
rise in the price of oil. The infusion of oil earnings into the state coffers effectively freed the
state from dependence on foreign capital, and led to the abandonment of technocratic efforts to
recast the economy along more competitive, market based lines within a legal regulatory
framework. The oil boom fueled growth without efficiency and the rapid expansion of the public
sector. By 1985, the combined sales from state enterprises accounted for 30% of the country's
GDP.10 Any effective incentive for reform of high cost, inefficient public enterprises was lost
to a funding source which enabled irrational growth and required no accounting of expenditure.
This would continue until the plunge in oil prices necessitated a restructuring of economic policy.
State capital, from the outset, was invested in strategic sectors of the economy.
Ownership remains concentrated in four primary areas, namely resources, infrastructure and
utilities, manufacturing, and the distribution of basic commodities. Resources have historically
occupied the most important economic sector because of their role as a major foreign exchange
Ibid, p. 223.
*oDjisman Simandjuntak, "Indonesia's Economic Development: Recovery After Deregulation", Indonesia
Quarter y, vol. XVI, no. 4, October 1988, p. 228.
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earner and provider of revenue for state coffers. Pertamina, Inhutani (forestry), Timah (tin
mining), and Aneka Tambang (general mining) are key public enterprises which the state has
used to establish production sharing agreements with foreign companies. The primary function
of these enterprises has been to collect taxes and royalties, and allocate concessions, while foreign
partners have taken responsibility for the bulk of investment and production. The utilities sector
is dominated by PUTL (public works), P.T. Telkom (telecommunications), and Perusahaan
Listrik Negara (electricity) through which the majority of state investment in national
infrastructure has passed. The manufacturing sector was developed and expanded to promote
national industrialization and has tended to focus on larger, more capital intensive industries
such as steel and ship building.
The state has also been heavily involved in the distribution of basic commodities. The
primary player has been Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik Nasional - National Logistics Board)
established in 1967 as a vehicle for the state to maintain control over the pricing and distribution
of basic staples, especially rice, sugar and flour. It has filled a political role, through its ability
to control shortages and price increases of staple foodstuffs by ensuring stable price and supply.
Through its control of distribution and ability to allocate contracts, Bulog has also been an
important source of patronage and funds. In the early 1970s, severe domestic rice shortages
occurred due to Bulog's failure to make necessary overseas purchases. In other years, rice was
imported when ample domestic supplies went unpurchased, evidence of ineffective management
and the ease to which Bulog fell victim to corrupting patron-client influences. In these sectors
where state capital remains a primary player, the government has attempted to instill greater
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competency within management ranks and eradicate those practices most open to patron-client
abuse. However, regularization still requires substantial improvement.
In Indonesia, the colonial legacy had a far more reactionary impact on the implementation
of economic policy. Malaysia, comfortable with its capitalist and bureaucratic orientation
adopted from the British, was influenced by a different set of criteria for embarking upon a state-
led economic development program. As a result of colonial economic policy, Malaysia inherited
at independence a far more ethnically diverse and divided population. The significant Chinese
economic position, though more substantial than Indonesia, was largely accepted in return for
bumiputra (indigenous Malay) political control through the dominant United Malay National
Organization (UMNO) party, and the power to politically engineer a greater piece of the
economic pie for the Malay population if necessary. From the outset of independence, Malaysia
followed a laissez-faire, free market approach based on the diversification of primary product
exports to the world market. Though the economic sector was dominated by Chinese and foreign
capital, the Malays were given few special privileges in an attempt to allow an open, competitive
market. This approach perpetuated the ethnic occupational specialization begun by the British.
By the late 1960's, bumiputra willingness to accept the growing economic gap between
themselves and the Chinese was growing thin. Malay corporate ownership had increased by a
negligible amount during the first decade of independence, gaining less than 1/3 of the increase
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of GNP while accounting for 1/2 the total population."1 The state itself was suffering a
legitimacy crisis: the non-Malay population viewed the state's policies as impartial and
preferential toward the Malays, while the Malays were unhappy with the free market, laissez faire
policy which gave a disproportionate economic return to the non-Malays. This discontent was
aggravated when, in 1969, the Malays suffered an electoral setback in the key state of Selangor,
losing seats to the Chinese opposition. Race riots broke out in Kuala Lumpur, shaking the
confidence of the Malay government, and stimulating suspension of the constitution and a change
in leadership.
The government viewed this outbreak of violence as manifestation of bumiputra
discontent over Chinese economic dominance, and sought to take a more active, interventionist
role in the allocation of economic resources to the Malay through use of public sector enterprise.
Capital ownership, management and control would be restructured to more accurately reflect the
ethnic composition of the population. The New Economic Policy (NEP) emerged as the
government's tool for instigating an economic and social transformation of Malaysian society with
the stated objective of fostering national unity and integration. This was to be achieved through
employment creation and growth to eliminate poverty; and the eradication of identification of
economic function with race. Restructuring the economy through growth, rather than
expropriation of foreign or domestic non-Malay capital ownership was an important underpinning
of this plan.
1 Just Faaland, Growth and Ethnic Inequality: Malaysia's New Economic Policy, (London, Hurst & Co.,
1990), p. 38.
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Laissez-faire policies had failed to bring about a necessary societal transformation; the
NEP was a sign of the government's admission of this failure and an indication of its new
interventionist role in the economy. The objectives of the NEP were formally incorporated in the
constitution and outlined in the Second Malaysian Plan (1971-75), which stated:
The NEP is designed to ensure that the government is sufficiently equipped to influence
the pattern of economic growth in directions which will bring about a more equitable
sharing of the benefits of growth and development among all Malaysians. 12
This plan called for a restructuring of assets to ensure 30% bumiputra ownership of total
commercial and industrial activities by 1990, striving for proportional participation of all ethnic
groups in all economic sectors. As in the case of Indonesia, the state sought to create a viable
indigenous commercial class to compete with Chinese and foreign capital. The establishment of
public enterprises became the primary vehicle for attaining this goal. These enterprises, in
tandem with the protection of quotas, access to government contracts, ownership and employment
requirements in foreign joint ventures, and favorable credit, training, and land acquisition
opportunities, formed commercial entities capable of competing with previously unchallenged
Chinese monopolies.
12 bid, p. 80.
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The primary entities formed to attain these goals were Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS)
and the Urban Development Authority (UDA). Before delving into the function of these
enterprises, mention should be made of the entity Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) established
in 1966 prior to the formulation of the NEP. MARA's mandate was to "promote, stimulate,
facilitate and undertake economic and social development in the Federation and more particularly
in the rural areas."" It was given greater power than its predecessor, the Rural and Industrial
Development Authority (RIDA) to develop commercial and industrial enterprises, and the focus
of its projects rapidly shifted to the urban areas. As the brainchild of a powerful Malay politician
anxious to gain the support of the poor Malay electorate, it was subject to political influence,
financial abuse, and accusations that it benefitted UMNO supporters. Due to its independence
and well established patterns and connections, MARA did not lend itself towards the new
development policies of the NEP. In the 1970's, it was reorganized in order to more closely
complement national development strategy.
PERNAS, established in 1969, became the largest and most successful government tool
for achieving the objectives of the NEP. Its goal was to establish government owned commercial
operations which would increase bumiputra ownership in industry to 30% by 1990. The state
learned from MARA's failures and steered away from the strategy of financing bumiputra
entrepreneurs from scratch. Rather, PERNAS relied on already established, successful businesses
in growth industries to establish its objectives. Through joint-ventures and the use of foreign
13 Bruce Gale, Politics and Public Enterprise in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur, Eastern University Press, 1981),
p. 51.
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managers, these new government owned bumiputra companies attempted to shield themselves
from more invasive patron-client influences. Investments tended to focus on plantation and
mining ventures.
In tandem with PERNAS, the UDA was established in 1971 to further implement the
NEP's restructuring goals by aiding Malays to establish themselves in the manufacturing, retailing
and service sectors of the economy. This was primarily accomplished through the provision of
commercial office space in Chinese dominated urban areas. The UDA's mission was, from the
outset, the most ethnically charged, as it actively promoted Malays to compete with the Chinese.
Both the UDA and PERNAS fell victim to financial mismanagement, a lack of accountability,
and abuse by Malay businessmen. These examples provide evidence of the limitations of solely
relying upon state enterprise to attain social and economic goals.
From the outset, social objectives of more equitable distribution of capital ownership, and
greater racial cohesion and unity formed the primary goal of the NEP's use of public enterprise
expansion. In Indonesia, social objectives were not featured as predominantly, taking a back seat
to economic goals of industrial growth and development. The primary impetus for state control
of strategic economic sectors varied, as reflection of the countries' variant political and social
environments.
In both Indonesia and Malaysia, public sector expansion altered the nature of power
sources and relationships, entrenching the authority of the state and political and military elites.
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The benefits reaped through controlling the means of production would prove addicting, and
increasingly difficult to relinquish as they became an institutionalized part of the system. The
earliest evidence of this shift can be seen in Indonesia with the rapid expansion of the military's
involvement in the economy, most notably following the nationalization of Dutch enterprise in
1957. These businesses were placed under the direct management of the army and quickly
became valuable sources of extra-budgetary funds to supplement the military's coffers. The
military's access to a substantial resource base provided ample opportunity for corruption and
personal aggrandizement. The lack of administrative oversight and accountability further
heightened the attractiveness of siphoning funds for both military and personal profit.
Initially, these state enterprises provided a funding base for the military otherwise
unavailable from a taxed government treasury. It is speculated that the military's formal
budgetary allocations routinely covered 50% of actual expenditures. 14 In the absence of sufficient
government funding for defense and security, the military learned to rely upon state enterprises
such as Pertamina and the rice trading agency Bulog, among others, as a source of revenue and
patronage. Unsupervised control over these agencies provided the ideal conditions for the
accumulation of vast amounts of wealth, and an independent power base for the military and its
members free of bureaucratic controls. Any chance these enterprises had for becoming viable,
profit generating entities was squelched by the military's early reliance upon them as
supplementary funding sources, sapping them of efficiency and accountability. These activities
14 Robison, p. 256.
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developed a commercial orientation within the military which has left an indelible mark on the
nation's economic structure.
The state's ability to provide adequate funding for the military became a reality in the
early 1970's with the oil boom and sudden rise in export revenues. However, the military's
reliance on public sector enterprise for supplementary funding had already become an
institutionalized "perk", and in the words of political scientist Harold Crouch, "old fund-raising
practices continued, partly because of the vested interests associated with them."" Few were
willing to give up their extensive network of privileges.
Implementation of "rational" economic policy was impeded by the increasing involvement
of the military in the economy. Policies were distorted and manipulated if they ran counter to
the business interests of the military, allowing the proliferation of inefficient, high-cost public
enterprises not subject to regular technocratic oversight. The failures of both Pertamina and
Bulog in the 1970's are tangible evidence of the rampant corruption and mismanagement which
plagued efficient operation of the public sector. The use of Pertamina as a source of revenue
through the allocation of oil concessions and collection of oil taxes represents the most glaring
example of the military's abuse of the public sector. Until its collapse in 1975, Pertamina was
essentially run by one man, Colonel Ibnu Sutowo, free of all technocratic "interference". Even
the spectacular financial debacle suffered by Pertamina at the hands of the military, totaling more
5 Harold Crouch and Zakaria Ahmad, eds., Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, (Singapore, Oxford
University Press, 1985), p. 67.
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than $10 billion in debt, did not fully reverse the trend of technocratic management exclusion.
Bulog's failure to provide a sufficient national rice supply in 1973 led to the removal of its
military director, yet corruption and irrational management persisted. Old habits die hard,
especially when their death poses a direct challenge to the power and patronage base of an
entrenched elite.
New public sector enterprises established to promote the goals of Malaysia's NEP created
fertile centers for expansion of political elite influence and resources. In contrast to Indonesia
where the military was the key beneficiary from the growth of the public sector, political
factions, particularly within the ruling UMNO party were the primary winners in Malaysia. With
access to a constant, dependable resource base, new patronage networks linking economic and
government structures began to develop, changing the character of traditional politics. The
strong bureaucratic and parliamentary tradition inherited from the British had largely served to
keep this type of patron-client network in check, yet with the creation of these new power
centers, access to new sources of funds and patronage proliferated, fueling the formation of
informal, mutually beneficial relationships.
UMNO leadership was able to balance their avowed role as promoters of social
development and change, as stated under the NEP, while simultaneously enhancing their political
staying power through the accumulation of wealth and influence. For the first time politically
powerful owners of equity emerged from the ranks of the party apparatus. This new found
resource base provided political leaders with a degree of independent legitimacy and support.
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The rise of the public sector's central role in economic planning has meant the further
accumulation of power in the hands of the executive branch and federal government versus the
legislature and state government. Within the UMNO structure, this process manifest itself through
the concentration of power in the party's top tier. 6
The NEP has offered an umbrella of protection for the use of public enterprise as
resource and patronage centers. The NEP's interventionist approach rationalizes the state's active
role in the promotion of economic redistribution. Public enterprise is an accepted instrument of
national policy for promoting the greater social and economic good, and as such, has lent a
degree of legitimacy to its use by individuals and political parties as a supplementary power base.
Though both owner and manager of public enterprise, the state is acting on behalf of the
bumiputras in gaining for them a more equitable economic share, and has not sought to develop
its own independent power base." Critics, however, maintain that a by-product of the NEP's
focus on ethnic issues has been to bolster the position of politically connected, yet economically
incompetent individuals who have used the plan to achieve personal ends. The redistribution of
wealth to lower-income Malays, additionally an important sector of the electorate, has been
complicated by the existence of this elite."
16Gale, p. 197.
17 John Taylor & Andrew Turton, eds., Sociology of Developing Societies: Southeast Asia, (New York,
Monthly Review Press, 1988), p. 20.
18Doug Tsuruoka and Michael Vatikiotis, "Finding a Focus", Far Eastern Economic Review, May 16, 1991,
p. 60.
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The justification of the state's active economic role by the NEP, in accordance with a
legal regulatory framework, is an important point of difference in the ramifications of public
sector expansion in Indonesia and Malaysia, and reinforces the importance of examining
economic policy within a political framework. Though both states have been described as
patrimonial in character, this tendency has been tempered in Malaysia by its democratic political
system, and the power of the vote to enforce a greater degree of accountability upon its political
and economic players. Malaysia has been described as possessing strong political institutions in
tandem with weak patrimonial structures, while Indonesia mirrors the reverse tendency towards
weak political institutions and rampant patrimonial and patron-client structures. The Indonesian
model provides fertile conditions for the state to develop a more independent power base.
However, phenomenal economic growth in both countries over the past two decades has perhaps
blurred these distinctions. The creation of a greater amount of wealth for distribution, and the
expansion of the pool of individuals with access to these resources, may deflect attention from
the state's perceived clientelist, patrimonial tendencies if there is sufficient "trickle down" gain
to expanded segments of the populous.
While the Indonesian state was characterized from the outset by patrimonial tendencies
in which political power determined economic power, the Malaysian state initially adhered to a
British bureaucratic model of strong political and administrative institutions free of outside
interference. The constitutional changes instituted under the NEP in the early 1970's marked the
beginning of a reappearance of patrimonial characteristics within the state, previously squelched
during the colonial era by the British. Political debate was restricted, bureaucratic and political
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processes were made less transparent, political decisions were concentrated at the highest
leadership levels, and the ability to dispense patronage to supporters increased, fueled by the
proliferation of public sector enterprise. The NEP provided opportunities for the expansion of
factionalism within the party structure and the spread of patron-client networks, as well as
defense for their protection. This shift to a more participatory, interventionist role for the state
was in direct opposition to the colonial precedent of limited government involvement.
EVOLUTION OF LINKAGES AMONG KEY ECONOMIC GROUPS
The key players in national economic growth have evolved along starkly divergent paths
in Indonesia and Malaysia due largely to the state's perceived mandate in fostering development.
In Indonesia, the fundamental component in this process has been the evolution of linkages
binding the economic interests of the military, the ruling family, and Chinese and foreign capital.
Interaction between these groups has created a common terminus of vested interests, linking state
power with needed non-indigenous capital. This combination of access to patronage and capital
has inspired a level of growth which might otherwise have been unattainable, and has molded
strategy and commitment to economic development. This is in contrast to the economic
development path pursued in Malaysia which has been influenced overwhelmingly by the socio-
political goals of the NEP. As a result, the forging of an effective alliance between state and
Chinese capital to enhance economic development was not a viable option. Because of the
continued large scale foreign participation in the economy following independence, in contrast
to Indonesia, the state was able to rely on foreign capital as an alternate, politically safer
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investment source to Chinese capital. These linkages, or lack of them, deserve special
consideration in understanding the players determining public sector expansion and the eventual
rationale for privatization.
The groundwork for the complex interplay of state and private interests in Indonesia
began before the birth of the Republic. At independence, Indonesia already possessed a
successful, entrenched Chinese trader community, connected to a well developed credit and
distribution network spanning Southeast Asia. Clandestine relationships with members of the
military to assist in extra-budgetary funding efforts began during the revolutionary period and
continued through the Sukarno era, signaling the beginnings of a mutually lucrative alliance.
Early attempts by the state to hamper the entrepreneurial success of the Chinese through
regulation often backfired. In an attempt to overcome Chinese monopolies and bolster the
development of indigenous capital, the government implemented the Benteng program in the early
1950's, distributing import licenses to over 5000 indigenous Indonesians. The majority of these
licenses were quickly sold off by the recipients to Chinese traders possessing greater experience
and capital, undermining the program's objective to develop an indigenous entrepreneurial class.
The Chinese monopoly position was enhanced through access to a greater number of licenses,
increasing their ability to permeate key sectors of the economy. Throughout the period, the
Chinese continued to cultivate their relations with the military as financiers of mutually
profitable, protective economic endeavors, and were well placed to take advantage of expanding
economic opportunities. Labeled the cukong system, this expanding network of business
arrangements linking Chinese business men with military officers has blurred lines of division
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between public-private and military-civilian sectors.
In tandem with Chinese economic expansion, the scope and function of the Army was
undergoing expansion to include both military and socio-political functions. The Army, because
of its role in the fight for Indonesia's independence, always felt it had a greater stake in the
Republic beyond matters of defense and security. It never viewed itself as an apolitical
organization, and sought to formalize its expanded, non-military role through the concept of the
'Middle Way', articulated by General Nasution in 1958, calling for the armed forces participation
in all areas of political and social life. With the public proclamation of the army's augmented
position, came a more rapid and open display of involvement in private enterprise and
exploitation of military office for personal profit. Local Chinese and, with the beginning of the
New Order in 1965, foreign investors, provided members of the military with much needed skill
and capital while the officers in return provided access to licenses, contracts and concessions,
as well as immunity from standard bureaucratic regulations. Military officers became highly
sought after as joint-venture partners, able to make or break the success of an enterprise. This
process intensified with the New Order's shift to a pro-active role in attracting foreign
investment. Military officers increasingly benefited in their comprador roles as local partners to
foreign investors, providing little more than access to a convoluted bureaucracy.19
19 Crouch and Zakaria, p. 69.
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From the outset, the military's economic muscle was dependent upon political influence
rather than entrepreneurial ability. Its early and substantial entry into business, meant the
military itself became a center for capital accumulation, creating an unhealthy degree of
independence and incentive to protect the viability of unprofitable domestic businesses. The
Chinese, as financiers of the military's expanding investments, gained political protection.
Increasingly in the New Order period, their value as an economic asset was recognized, and their
capital and skills were put to use to revitalize the economy.
The proliferation of these ties linking the government, military and Chinese have had
significant implications for patterns of growth, distribution and patronage. On the one hand,
some claim the cukong system has lent a degree of stability to the regime, fostering cooperation
for mutual benefit rather than competition among these groups. The state and military, in their
integration with Chinese and foreign capital have formed a center of common vested interests,
linking economic and political power in a manner not previously witnessed in Indonesia. As
capital accumulation continues among the political elite, this constitutes a trend away from
reliance on traditional modes of power. Increasingly, members of the military and Suharto
family are becoming legitimate economic players, providing a basis of power which transcends
the presidential palace.
On the other hand, this multifaceted alliance has been criticized for its blatant disregard
of technocratic efforts to 'regularize' the economy and promote more balanced economic growth.
The perpetuation of protected public sector enterprise, as a tool of national industrial policy,
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fostered production along inefficient, non-competitive lines. As patronage and power centers,
little incentive existed for their dismantlement. In addition, pribumi businessmen have resented
the special treatment the Chinese have received and feel entrepreneurial activity has been stifled,
through the proliferation of conglomerates and subsidies, preventing competition by smaller
players. Though the Chinese make-up only 4% of the nation's 180 million inhabitants, they
account for two-thirds of all private economic activity. 20 From a political standpoint, some feel
the military has been able to maintain dominance of the political system, precisely because
Chinese economic dominance has prevented the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie,
capable of challenging military rule.21
The Indonesian government has been disinclined to institute compulsory requirements for
wealth redistribution along the lines of the NEP, for fear this might exacerbate rather than
facilitate cooperation among ethnic groups. In light of national sensitivity over race, the
government has chosen not to make an ethnic distinction, and instead describes its efforts as
promoting "weak economic groups". If ethnic economic disparities continue to widen, and a
dearth of capable pribumi businessmen continues, some believe Indonesia will have no choice but
to implement an NEP-style system. 22 In the meantime, the government has chosen to promote
less invasive measures to overcome these disparities. Beginning last year, President Suharto
"suggested" Chinese-owned conglomerates divest up to 25% of their holdings to cooperatives.
20 Adam Schwarz, "A Piece of the Action", Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2, 1991, p. 39.
" Robison, p. 320.
"2Schwarz, p. 40.
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By early 1991, 105 companies had followed this request, yet the majority sold less than 1%,
giving little hope the scheme would significantly alleviate economic disparities. The most recent
government attempt to promote pribumi business has been dubbed the "linkage program",
coupling smaller indigenous businesses with larger Chinese conglomerates, providing pribumis
with access to training, capital, and opportunity. 10,000 companies have thus far been identified,
and 200 have volunteered to participate as potential "foster fathers" for small and medium sized
pribumi firms, with the Ministry of Industry serving as matchmaker.23 It is too early to predict
how this new scheme will fair in lessening the widening income gap between ethnic groups.
There is also a political element to be considered. Though the government publicly
supports increasing pribumi capital ownership, a potentially powerful, autonomous business class
with political clout to rival the status quo may prove to be a deterrent to government support.
Conversely, ethnic Chinese businessmen, representing only 4% of the population, pose no such
political threat. However, their ability to stir indigenous discontent over income disparity must
be factored into the equation.
The absence of ties binding Chinese business and state economic interests has played an
equally important role in the development of Malaysia's national economy. At independence,
both Chinese and foreign capital occupied a dominant position in the economy. The Chinese
presence was greatest in the trading and mining sectors, due to the prohibition during the colonial
23 Ibid, p. 39.
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period of migrant land ownership and civil service employment. The British, with their
paternalistic policies intended to shield the Malays from the development of the modern economy,
effectively established a precedent for protection of the Malay versus Chinese competition. The
large percentage of foreign ownership in the economy received favorable treatment by the newly
independent government, a move that has been interpreted as a reflection of Malay insecurity
toward Chinese economic dominance. Scholars have argued that foreign capital was more
manageable politically, and thus preferable to reliance on the Chinese.
From the outset, the Chinese in Malaysia have had a more independent power base than
their counterparts in Indonesia. Representing one third of the total population, with access to
political expression through the right to vote, the Chinese have constituted a significant voice
which the Malay majority could not ignore. Malaysia's more open economic and political system
removed the need for the Chinese to forge alliances for the sole purpose of economic survival,
i.e., gaining access to licenses and concessions. Conversely, survival in Indonesia has required
a degree of assimilation and protection by a powerful patron, two trends which have not
characterized Chinese development in Malaysia. It should be noted that the military, which has
played such a key role in the growth and protection of Chinese capital in Indonesia, has, as an
apolitical institution in Malaysia, played no such corresponding function.
With the founding of the Republic, the Barisan National was established, bringing
24 James Jesudson, Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia,
(Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 56.
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together a diverse collection of political parties comprised of Malays, Chinese and Indians,
reflecting the nation's disparate ethnic make-up. From the outset it was a political alliance
founded on compromise: unity was based on the understanding that non-Malays would be allowed
to dominate the economy in exchange for the continuation of Malay dominance over the political
realm. Thus emerged the laissez-faire economic environment which characterized the period
from 1957-69. Chinese and foreign business flourished in these conditions, while simultaneously
hastening the ethnic polarization of Malaysian society by increasing economic disparities.
However, this changed markedly in 1970 with the introduction of the NEP and a move
towards employment of the state apparatus to correct economic imbalances among the ethnic
groups, in response to the discontent of economically marginalized Malays. The abandonment
of laissez faire policies and the adoption of an active role by the state in promoting Malay wealth
and employment, meant the Chinese had to develop more creative ways to work around
increasingly convoluted restraints. The state turned to multinational companies as a means to
further political goals, linking Malay employment and ownership requirements to MNC operation
in Malaysia. According to Malaysian scholar James Jesudson "as the state carried out its
restructuring goals, multinationals helped to keep the economy afloat by absorbing labor and
providing ownership opportunities for Malay interests in manufacturing."" However, the policy
of redistribution through growth could not have succeeded without the injection of Chinese
capital into the economy, in the absence of a developed indigenous capitalist class.
25 Ibid, p. 166.
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The ramifications of the NEP have meant that, rather than collaborating, the Malay
political elite and Chinese business have followed divergent economic paths and have ultimately
been working at cross purposes. The politics of ethnicity have often overridden economic
rationality and inhibited the forging of an alliance between political and economic power.
Conversely in Indonesia, the state (more accurately the military and Suharto family) used Chinese
economic power to develop its own financial base. In Malaysia the state relied more heavily on
foreign capital, and has in the 1980's sought to transfer economic patronage to the ruling political
party UMNO through privatization of state companies, in an effort to legitimize its growing
economic holdings.
Malaysia's Chinese, far from being nurtured and protected as cukongs to powerful
patrons as in Indonesia, have had to overcome institutionalized prejudices on a grander scale.
Some have postulated this has forced greater competitiveness, resourcefulness, and independence
in Chinese efforts to surmount government barriers. It has also meant they have tended to take
a shorter-term investment perspective and have focused on safer financial returns. 26 In the face
of economic stagnation in the mid-1980's, the state relaxed restrictions on overseas investment
to stimulate the economy. The acquisition of capital by the state, whether it be overseas Chinese
or foreign, superceded a number of the NEP goals in order to stimulate growth and development.
However, economic crisis was not significant reason for the state to refute a 20 year old policy
26 Ibid, p. 151.
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and cast aside the foundations of the NEP to collaborate with the domestic Chinese. Currently,
record breaking levels of foreign investment, fueling growth of one of the fastest expanding
economies in the world, may effectively remove the need for adoption of a more accommodating
policy toward local Chinese capital. It remains to be seen whether Malaysia's outstanding
economic growth rates in the late '80's will affect the government stance on future cooperation,
and what aspects of the NEP will be perpetuated beyond its extended expiration date this year.
PRIVATIZATION ASIAN-STYLE
In the strict, some say western sense of the word, the term privatization refers to the
transfer of ownership and decision making from the public to private sector, thus reducing the
role of the state and enhancing the influence of market forces. Yet if this definition is applied
to the processes occurring within the economies of Malaysia and Indonesia, privatization would
appear to have a far narrower scope than it actually does. If "full" privatization is defined as
government divestment of 100% of equity, then barring Japan, not a single major Asian state
enterprise has been wholly privatized.27 It is necessary to expand this definition to incorporate
a number of alternate methods which have been employed to lessen the state's hand in the
economy. These include the transfer of ownership, the transfer of production, and deregulation
of the economy, namely liberalization of government regulations interfering with market forces.
There have also been increasing efforts to make the remaining public enterprises more transparent
27 Matthew Montagu-Pollack, "Privatization: What Went Wrong?", Asian Business, August 1990, p. 32.
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and accountable. The state in Malaysia and Indonesia has relied on a mix of the above in its
effort to reduce its economic role and increase private sector participation. Privatization of public
enterprise provides the most tangible means of measuring ownership transfer to the private sector,
is the purest form of government divestment and represents a sign of strong commitment on the
part of the government to privatization. Thus, for the purpose of this study, discussions of
privatization will focus on the divestment of public enterprises and the actual degree of transfer
from public to private sector.
The stated objectives of privatization programs in both Malaysia and Indonesia have
focused on reduction of financial strain on the federal budget, and overall size of the public
sector; promotion of competition, efficiency, and productivity in a changing economic climate;
and acceleration of economic growth through the increased participation of the private sector.
In Malaysia, poor financial planning and management has meant the loss of billions of dollars
by public enterprises including Bank Bumiputra, Kedah Cement, and the Urban Development
Authority. By the mid-80s, public enterprises were responsible for 1/3 of total public sector debt
and 30% of total debt servicing. 28 In 1989, a government audit conducted in Indonesia indicated
that of 189 companies in which the government held a majority stake, 2/3 of them were
determined to be financially 'unhealthy' .29 However complaints arose quickly regarding
evaluation criteria, from among others, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, which faced a
2e Edmund Terrence Gomez, "Malaysia's Liberalization is Skin Deep", The Asian Wall Street Journal, May
20, 1991, p. 14.
29 Adam Schwarz, "A Lame Duck Hunt", Far Eastern Economic Review, November 23, 1989, p. 72.
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particularly poor audit with seven of the ministry's eight companies classified as unhealthy,
including Pertamina and electricity utility PLN. Critics claimed the parameters for evaluating
the health of companies must take into consideration the fact that many of them operate with
explicit social and economic development goals, often incompatible with the profit motive.
According to one Pertamina official, "We cannot be measured against normal levels of
profitability. Our corporate mission is different." 30
Just as public enterprise has been used as an instrument for promoting social goals rather
than economic growth, privatization of these enterprises has meant the perpetuation of strong
social objectives in tandem with more straightforward economic goals. The pursuit of socio-
economic targets is most blatantly apparent in Malaysia, where privatization has been used as a
means for achieving the restructuring objectives of the NEP. The NEP's goal of shifting 30%
of the country's corporate wealth to bumiputra ownership was a motivating force behind the rise
of the public sector in the 1970's, and represents a significant force behind privatization efforts
in the 80's and 90's. The National Equity Corporation (PNB) has been a primary vehicle for
attaining this objective through its purchase of shares of both private and public Malaysian
companies with high growth potential to be held in trust for eventual sale to the bumiputra
community. One third of bumiputra capital ownership is held through trust funds such as the
PNB, as distinct from individual holdings. 31 As a trust fund, the PNB provides a collective
30 Ben Davies, "Letting in the Light at Pertamina", Euromoney, December 1989, p. 68.
31 Faaland, p. 234.
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source of capital through which bumiputras can exercise influence. Though classified as a
commercial venture, it remains answerable to the government. The government thus remains a
key player in this scheme, and has been criticized for stifling private entrepreneurship and
promoting a program which is in direct conflict with the goals of privatization."
Within this setting, the most prevalent modes of privatization have been those involving
ownership, primarily in the form of new listings on the stock market, and those involving
organizational and operational change, such as the disbursement of contracts and leases to the
private sector and the formation of holding companies with private subsidiaries. In the interest
of an open and efficient transition from public to private ownership, listing on the stock exchange
has been the traditionally preferred method of divesture. The degree of actual transfer via stock
listings has been limited for a number of reasons, including the fledgling developmental stage of
the capital markets with limited absorptive capacity.
Despite the increasing amount of share sales to the public, the state has maintained
sizeable ownership and involvement in the operation of these enterprises in both Malaysia and
Indonesia. Total "privatization" in the western sense is a rarity. Rather more accurately, many
of these companies have been "corporatized"; through the issuing of shares to the public and the
replacement of a bureaucratic board of directors with a new private sector board, these companies
have been restructured as private entities. Malaysian Airline System (MAS) was the first
32 V.V. Ranaradham, ed., Privatization in Developing Countries, (London, Routledge, 1989), p. 410.
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government agency in Malaysia to be privatized through the public flotation of 30% of its equity.
However, despite partial privatization in share ownership, the central bank, Bank Negara,
continues to hold a 52% interest in MAS, and the state maintains control over the board and
management.33 Thus many of the former state enterprises have simply become private sector
monopolies. Critics fear underlying goals of privatization, such as increased competition and
accountability to non-governmental shareholders are being undercut by the state's continued
involvement in corporatized enterprises.
Another common mode of privatization "Asian-style" has been the disbursement of
contracts by the state to the private sector, particularly in the area of public works projects. This
type of arrangement is distinctly different from the actual issuing of shares, and has been used
as a means for cutting government expenditure on large expensive projects and for increasing
private sector participation in an area of the economy previously off-limits. The contractor, often
a member of the political elite, retains a stake in management and/or receives a cut of the profits.
In Indonesia, a business group controlled by Suharto's daughter Siti Hadijanti Rukmana was
awarded a substantial contract for building a major highway running through Jakarta. Her
business group maintains management of the toll road and takes a slice of the profits. Her
younger brother Tommy is also building a toll road in West Java. In Malaysia, on a grander
scale, the M$6 billion contract for construction of the North-South Highway running the length
of peninsular Malaysia was awarded to United Engineers Malaysia (UEM), at the time a poorly
33Doug Tsuruoka, "Privatized Patronage", Far Eastern Economic Review, December 20, 1990, p. 43.
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performing company with no track record in highway construction. UEM has also recently won
a second M$1 billion contract to build a causeway linking Johor and Singapore as part of the
"growth triangle" scheme joining Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. It should be noted that
UEM is controlled by UMNO and the Prime Minister is a trustee of the company.
The awarding of Malaysia's biggest public works project to UEM still arouses resentment
among much of the population as a blatant misuse of political patronage. Part of the resentment
comes from the fact that there has been no public bidding on these projects, fueling charges of
political favoritism. The government claims this is perfectly legitimate, in keeping with its
bidding policy of "first come, first served", designed to reward private sector initiative and
entrepreneurship. Without a competitive bidding process, few believe innovation and
entrepreneurship are being fostered within the bumiputra community. The importance of the
relationship between these contractors and the state is key in understanding the reconstitution of
political power and will be returned to shortly. The awarding of these contracts as a form of
privatization has created a new realm of patronage for politico-bureaucrats seeking to enhance
their political and economic power base.
Privatization plans have proceeded more rapidly in Malaysia than Indonesia. A 'master
plan' drawn up by a group of financial advisors, recently identified 246 public enterprises worth
U.S. $5.9 billion with privatization potential. Though reliable information on privatized
companies is difficult to obtain due to government policy not to disclose the names of
successfully privatized entities, government figures reveal that 32 companies have currently been
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divested to the private sector. 4 Privatization has been partial and selective, with the government
maintaining its position as major shareholder in most cases. Areas where state assets have been
sold include the national airline MAS, the national shipping carrier Malaysian International
Shipping Company (MISC), the container terminal at Port Klang, and the Department of
Telecommunications recently restructured as the private company Syarikat Telecom Malaysia
Berhad (STMB), yet still fully owned by the government. This maintenance of control by the
government, coupled with the increasing transfer of assets and their reorganization under the
ruling party UMNO, has raised question as to the government's commitment to reducing the
state's hand in the economy and its motivation for doing so. Government divesture of some debt-
laden enterprises has reduced the state's financial burden, transferring approximately M$7.45
billion of outstanding debt from the public to private sector." Profitable public enterprises have
been more popular among buyers and have been sold off rapidly, often heavily over subscribed
due to underpricing of shares. Those public enterprises sustaining heavy losses concentrated in
the heavy industry sector, and subject to government regulation and restrictions such as cement,
steel, and forest products will no doubt remain in government hands. The Malaysian railways
also falls into this category; the government has been unable to sell it off even at a substantially
discounted price of M$1 million.
34Montagu-Pollack, p. 32.
35 Gomez, p. 14.
46
President Suharto first proposed the idea of privatizing some of Indonesia's 200 public
enterprises, most of which have been financial losers, in 1986 following the oil crash. Yet not
until April 1990 did the first government divesture occur with the sale of 70% of the struggling
tire company Intirub to the Bimantara Citra Group, controlled by Suharto's son Bambang
Trihatmodjo. From privatizations beginnings, questions have accompanied the selection process
of prospective buyers and contract recipients. In the case of Intirub, three other business groups
bid for the company's purchase, all larger and more experienced than Bimantara.
From the outset, Indonesia has taken a far more cautious approach to privatization than
Malaysia. Most analysts agree that the primary obstacles to privatization are political. The
state's role of operating public enterprises is enshrined in the constitution as one of the three
pillars of the economy. However, the importance of Article 33 can be viewed from the
perspective of the principles it espouses rather than the form of ownership of particular
companies. The constitution stresses the principle of "Kekeluargaan" which Sukarno translated
as "collectivism". The current trend is moving towards applying this concept to private
companies.
Though privatization progress has been slow, the Finance Ministry has drafted guidelines
to clarify the government's position. The Ministry has announced that 52 state enterprises may
be prospective targets for privatization in the near future. The mode of divesture clearly favored
by the Ministry is the selling of shares through the stock market. Government regulation requires
that a company record two consecutive years of profit prior to listing shares. However, this
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requirement was recently waived for cement giant Indocement, controlled by Liem Sioe Liong's
Salim group, unleashing a barrage of criticism against the state's willingness to bend the rules
for a politically well-connected ally.
Given the "unhealthy" status of 2/3 of Indonesia's public enterprises, the Finance
Ministry listed a number of possible options to rectify the maladies affecting the public sector:
mergers with healthier state enterprises, splintering off of subsidiaries, hiring short-term private
sector managers, listing shares on the stock exchange, and, in extreme cases, liquidation.3 6 A
further issue requiring consideration is which of these companies can pull in a profit when forced
to operate in a competitive environment? It may prove difficult to push the sale of shares in a
private company that previously struggled for its livelihood, even with government protection and
privileges.
The existence of key state enterprises will continue. However, even those with staying
power, straddling crucial sectors of the economy have become subject to increasing scrutiny in
the desire to foster greater transparency within the system. Pertamina, representing Indonesia's
quintessential state enterprise, has been undergoing gradual reform since its embarrassing
financial crisis of the mid 1970's. For the first time, a civilian has been appointed to head the
enterprise, signaling the end of two decades of military control and a major shift in government
policy. Though Pertamina's role as the manager of oil resources is protected by the constitution,
36 Schwarz, "A Lame Duck Hunt", p. 72.
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it clearly must speed the move towards more transparent management to safeguard continued
foreign investment in the oil sector: 80% of Indonesia's oil is produced under contracts with
foreign companies. 37 In order to continue growth within a public sector framework, efforts have
been made to streamline Pertamina's employee base as well as its peripheral assets. Up to 20
of the company's joint-ventures not directly related to the hydrocarbon industry may be sold off.
Production sharing contracts with domestic companies have also been pursued, heralding a shift
away from total reliance on foreign partners. However, critics charge as long as Pertamina
remains an instrument of national economic strategy, inefficiencies will persist. 70% of
Pertamina's total operations goes towards supplying oil for domestic consumption, a service for
which the company is not allowed to take a profit.38 This example illustrates the often inherent
contradiction between pursuing social objectives and trying to run a profitable industry.
The move towards privatization has been hindered by a spate of problems which have
slowed the pace of public sector dismantlement. The concept of privatization was not a
consideration in most of the world's developing countries during earlier days of economic
prosperity. The results of rapid expansion of the public sector in tandem with the economic
realities of the 1980's have forced both Malaysia and Indonesia to implement divestment
programs. The ideological underpinnings of national economic plans have had to keep pace with
the new economic environment and create conditions conducive to a viable economy. The choice
"7Davies, p. 68.
38 Ibid, p. 70.
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of privatization has thus been made based on necessity and due to outside influences.
Problems of implementation abound. The institutional mechanisms necessary to support
the privatization process remain underdeveloped. The size and level of development of the
capital markets are inadequate for handling large equity sales, though it is anticipated the
injection of new capital and players will strengthen the market over time. Privatization could
result in up to US$1.8 billion of new equity being injected annually into the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange in the near future.39 The Privatization Master Plan, released in February of this year,
calls for the privatization of 37 public enterprises and projects over the next two years and the
restructuring of 56 others. In light of the market's underdevelopment and limited absorptive
capacity, this means companies may have to be sold to financially well-positioned foreigners and
locals, namely Chinese business groups, which may be politically unacceptable and arouse
nationalist sentiment. Because many public enterprises are money losers, divestment through
capital markets may not be an option, as in Indonesia, where the law requires two years of
consecutive profits prior to listing.
A further hinderance is the difficulty in establishing market value of an asset, exacerbated
when governments do not follow generally accepted accounting procedures. Due to the lack of
proper books of account, it took the Malaysian government 6 months to determine the value of
the Department of Telecommunications before it could be corporatized as STMB. As a result
"9Doug Tsuruoka, "The Shares Scramble", Far Eastern Economic Review, December 20, 1990, p. 44.
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of these problems, the newly formed STMB lost its first full year of profits due to the overvalued
assets and undervalued debt it inherited.' These problems persist: In 1986, the newly privatized
entity owed creditors M$500 million. As of 1990, that figure had escalated to nearly M$4
billion.4 '
The traditional importance of public enterprises' non-commercial objectives and the
government's desire to perpetuate these goals after privatization have also slowed the transition.
Promotion of social welfare and national development often run counter to the goal of turning
a profit and thus intimidates would-be purchasers from saddling themselves with a money loser.
If there is simply a shift of loses from the public to the private sector, serious doubts may be
created as to the economic advantages of privatization, and the government may be compelled
to offer continued subsidies and protection.
The government must also decide what businesses it wants to be in, something often not
clear from its portfolio of assets. Critics have pointed to the haphazard implementation of
privatization measures. While Indonesia has focused on trying to sell-off chronic money losers
to reduce the state's financial burden, Malaysia has adopted a different strategy, selling off
public enterprises as quickly as it can find buyers. This has resulted in the sale of the most
profitable enterprises, leaving the state holding the money losers. This has been interpreted as
40 Montagu-Pollack, p. 35.
41 Tsuruoka, "Privatized Patronage", p. 43.
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a greater long-term commitment to privatization on the part of Malaysia, regardless of the initial
up-front costs.
There are also political constraints to be considered. Resistance from interest groups
which stand to lose in the move towards privatization, means a lack of supportive, motivated
participants. This applies to labor and management benefitting from employment, perks and
influence, as well as politico-bureaucrats profiting from the public sector as a source of patronage
and extra-budgetary financing. The government's reliance on public enterprise and protectionist
policies has created a shortage of qualified, capable managers by hindering the emergence of
entrepreneurship and managerial skills, talents needed to fuel the transition to a market based
economy. This too has slowed the process.
In both Malaysia and Indonesia, public enterprise has traditionally been used as a
counterweight to Chinese economic influence. In the move toward privatization, Chinese
business conglomerates are best equipped to take advantage of the expanding opportunities
presented by the shrinking public sector. This issue poses the greatest dilemma in Indonesia,
where the indigenous population does not have the institutionalized protections of their
counterparts in Malaysia. Though the Chinese possess the necessary capital and managerial skills
to take over public enterprises, this may create significant political problems for the state.
Malaysia has gotten around this obstacle by linking privatization to the objectives of the NEP.
Public enterprises were initially created to assist the economic development of the Malay
population, a basic tenet of the NEP. Within this framework, privatization is not politically
viable unless it furthers the same goal. This change in rhetoric in favor of the private over public
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sector is justified by the state because "Bumiputra entrepreneurship and presence have greatly
improved since the early days of the NEP and they are therefore capable of taking up their share
of the privatized services." 42 However, this correlation between privatization and the NEP may
have some debilitating effects on the success of the transformation from public to private
enterprise as the pool of capable, financially endowed players is effectively reduced by limiting
Chinese participation.
PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
Who exactly are the significant players in the privatization process and how have they
changed? These questions are inherently linked to the politics of privatization and its use as a
means of legitimizing political ownership and control. The transformation of the economic order
has necessitated the implementation of structural change and a reworking of the tools for
maintaining political control and dominance. The need to rationalize the economic system, has
posed a direct challenge to the perpetuation of the reigning political interests, long bolstered by
an economic system which guaranteed a select few a disproportionate return.
Both Indonesia and Malaysia have experienced a reconstitution of the traditional economic
players under private sector labels. These groups are operating more openly on their own behalf
and actively participating in the process of capital accumulation. It is no longer simply "the
42 Ng Chee Yuen & Norbert Wagner, "Privatization and Deregulation in ASEAN, an Overview", ASEAN
Economic Bulletin, March, 1989, p. 220.
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state" operating in the name of the populace and the greater good, but subsets of the state
attempting to establish their own autonomous economic base within the new economic order.
Through expanded economic ownership, these groups have sought to strengthen and bolster their
political position by forming an independent capital base which will provide clout and freedom
beyond the volatility of the political system. This has led to increasing difficulty in distinguishing
between the public and private domain, particularly differentiating between companies owned by
politico-bureaucrats on behalf of political institutions versus those owned for their own private
benefit.43
Heavy government involvement continues to prevail under the guise of private enterprise.
There has been a transfer of economic patronage from the state to the ruling political party,
UMNO, in Malaysia, and from the state to the ruling family in Indonesia. Close linkages
between party politics, the bureaucracy and business have been maintained. Paul Cook, in his
study of privatization in Malaysia, observes that within this complex, privatization is unlikely to
be more than a rearrangement of economic and political power rather than any great change in
the make-up of the complex. According to this theory, privatization represents a shifting of
ownership within pre-existing power groups." Yet as these rearrangements occur within
traditional ruling elite groups, their economic power base has become broader and more
autonomous, creating a foundation for viability beyond the existing political structure.
43 Richard Robison, "After the Gold Rush: the Politics of Economic Restructuring in Indonesia in the 1980's",
Southeast Asia in the 1980's, (Sydney, Australia, Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1987), p. 345.
as"Paul Cook and Colin Kirkpatrick, eds., Privatization in Less Developed Countries, (Sussex, England,
Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), p. 253.
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Public sector expansion was in part initiated to fill the gap created by the lack of an
indigenous capitalist class capable of undertaking development and expansion of key economic
sectors. In the 1980s and 90s, development of an indigenous entrepreneurial group has not
reached the required levels to pick-up the slack created by the shrinking public sector and provide
a counterweight to foreign and Chinese capital. This absence has been interpreted by both
UMNO and the Suharto family as sufficient justification for their amplified economic
involvement, masked behind the stated aim to assist indigenous participants gain a piece of the
opportunities presented by privatization.
The nature of the political system has impacted significantly the growth of the key private
sector players and their perceived role in the process of national development. The ideologies
espoused by a democratic versus an authoritarian political system have determined the form of
economic and political behavior deemed acceptable by a ruling elite. In Malaysia's democratic
party system, it is the goal of the political elite to protect the party's position and assets in order
to ensure its return to power in an election. Through ownership of an expanding array of multi-
purpose holding companies with a wide range of business interests, UMNO has ensured its access
to a growing pool of corporate assets to aide in its maintenance of political power. While
business conglomerates throughout Asia thrive on government patronage, no group of companies
owned outright by a political party have profited to such extent from government favor. 45
Conversely, in the authoritarian, military-dominated state of Indonesia, the overriding goal is to
45Doug Tsuruoka, "UMNO's Money Machine", Far Eastern Economic Review, July 5, 1990, p. 48.
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protect the position and assets of the ruler and the military. As a political elite, maintaining
favorable patron-client ties which will guarantee privileged access and favorable treatment is the
predominant goal, ensuring continued access to a piece of the economic pie.
The rapid growth of prominent corporate conglomerates and their respective nuclei of
power is reflective of these contrasting political systems. The accepted parameters of corporate
operation have traditionally been defined and developed as a product of political ideology and
goals. Recently, political ideology has had to bow to overriding economic pressures necessitating
the adoption of more efficient, transparent modes of economic organization and growth. The
move towards privatization and the emergence of select groups of individual and political party
interests as powerful owners of equity has been an important outcome of the political and
economic transitions of the 1980's.
An array of political and economic factors constitute the primary motivations for the
expanded economic role taken on by these groups in the move toward privatization and
dismantlement of the public sector. The legitimacy of the state in both Malaysia and Indonesia
has been bolstered by outstanding economic growth rates, which has mitigated public protest
versus political repression and economic inequality. A controlled political forum was accepted
by many in return for the opportunity to significantly improve one's economic position. The
legitimacy of Suharto's New Order, as well as the UMNO party has been based on the promise
of economic development, linking the stability of the political order to sustained growth. With
the declining ability of the public sector to meet development goals, privatization has been
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adopted as a necessity for sustaining growth and ultimately, maintaining political stability and
legitimacy.
In Malaysia, the UMNO party has fashioned itself as an agent of growth and national
development. Its mandate has been founded on promoting the goals of the NEP and furthering
the Malay economic position. The party's success in linking its objectives to those of the NEP
as its modus operandi has given it the advantage of clearly stated, publicly accepted goals of
development and equitable distribution as compared to the more nebulous unofficial promotion
of pribumi rights in Indonesia. Based on its mandate to promote the rights of the majority,
UMNO's reigning position is legitimate within the eyes of the populace which possesses the
power of the vote to keep the party in check should it abuse it's position. As a champion of
Malay rights, UMNO has gained Malay loyalty and, psychologically, has bolstered the Malay
populations own sense of competence and self-worth. Some analysts have criticized the
identification of the state with one segment of society, namely the Malays to the detriment of the
Chinese and the Indians, as a factor undermining the state's legitimacy. Yet the bottom line rests
on the fact that it is the Malay community which possesses political power, and thus catering
to its interests remains the surest way to be voted back into office. Further criticism has been
levied versus the state's increasing role in capital accumulation, particularly UMNO's expanding
economic holdings, as undermining and contradicting the state's legitimation function." However
this analysis ignores the fact that UMNO's need for legitimacy within the formal state structure
46 Taylor and Turton, p. 20.
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lessens as it develops an autonomous financial base independent of the political system and
justified by the NEP's goal to increase Malay corporate ownership. With the official expiration
of the NEP last year, it remains to be seen how its successor, the Outline Perspective Plan for
1991-2000, to be announced in June of this year, will handle targets for racial distribution of
wealth. Though short of its goal of placing 30% of Malaysia's corporate equity in the hands of
indigenous Malays, the NEP has been largely responsible for an increase in bumiputra capital
from 3% in 1970 to 25% in 1990. This has likely influenced Prime Minister Mahathir's recent
stress on rapid economic growth at the expense of redistribution of wealth in favor of bumiputras,
representing a potentially dramatic shift in government policy. 47
The rapid economic growth experienced by Indonesia in the 1970's based on the oil
boom, provided Suharto's New Order regime with a broad based stamp of legitimacy. Though
the income gap between rich and poor increased, the base subsistence level of the poor also rose,
mitigating cries of inequitable distribution. The recent moves toward trimming down the large,
inefficient public sector has directly benefited a few privileged players who have parlayed close
relationships with Suharto into vast corporate empires. Suharto's own family has been the most
significant and visible benefactor. The proliferation of family owned conglomerates, particularly
those of Suharto's children, are indisputably fueling economic development. Some analysts have
gone so far as to say that Suharto's children have succeeded in breaking the bureaucratic
stranglehold the state has traditionally held over key industries like petrochemicals, air transport,
47Tsuruoka and Vatikiotis, p. 60.
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public works construction, and television. 48 This may be the case, yet economists agree that these
privileged business groups are hindering the entrepreneurial initiative of indigenous businessmen
who have been squeezed out of the privatization process. Thus, companies such as the large
conglomerates Bimantara and Humpuss, owned by two of Suharto's sons, are increasingly targets
for hostility traditionally directed at the ethnic Chinese. The perceived excess and rapid
economic gain of the Suharto family has increasingly come under fire, weakening the regime's
legitimacy. Criticism of Suharto's betrayal of the revolutionary ethos which the nation was
founded upon, and failure to distinguish between his family's interests and those of the state have
become more prevalent. The transfer of patronage from the state to the ruling family does not
command the degree of legitimacy and institutional protection as the transfer from state to
political party, as in the case of Malaysia.
Politically, the power structure in both Indonesia and Malaysia is dependent upon the
ability to generate and distribute patronage. The new and evolving economic players have had
to develop new channels of access within their growing empires to replace the decline of the
public sector. The underlying power of politico-bureaucrats has been based on their ability to
use and allocate the benefits of political office. Pribumi and Chinese businessmen alike have
depended on privileged access to concessions and contracts to fuel the growth of their business
activities. Now, rather than entering into a partnership with the state, the goal is to seek
profitable joint-ventures with these new agents of development able to use their political
"sAdam Schwarz and Jonathan Friedland, "No Mere Middlemen", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 23,
1990, p. 56.
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connections to muscle in on newly profitable industries. UMNO has relied on patronage to
award politically influential party members by appointing them as directors of the many
companies controlled by UMNO. In Indonesia, political allies and cronies have been brought
into the family-run conglomerates as partners, coming in on the ground floor of lucrative new
industries. Critics charge that these conglomerates, whether operated by a political party or
ruling family, are inhibiting technocratic efforts to recast the economy along more competitive,
market based lines. The state's public support of economic deregulation and liberalization is
undermined by its advocacy of conglomerate growth which is outside the legal regulatory system.
In spite of these criticisms, these new economic players, in following in the footsteps of
their predecessors, are likely to remain dependent on patronage to fuel their growth in the near
future. It is impossible to restructure the system overnight; patronage and the importance of
connections is a vestige of the old that is likely to remain a prevalent part of doing business in
the 1990s. In responding to criticism that the Suharto family conglomerate Humpuss, run by 28
year old Tommy Suharto, was only invited to participate in joint venture projects to facilitate
government approvals, a senior Humpuss executive replied,
In Indonesia, who you know is important but that is true in New York, too. People with
good information and good relationships have the right to make the best of what they
have. We have done an outstanding job in technical marketing. We want to become an
industrial company solving the future problems of Indonesia.49
49 Ibid, p. 59.
60
This desire to become viable and recognized contributors in the process of economic
development, above and beyond association with a political party or family, is an increasingly
common theme which may gain credibility with the passage of time.
Politically, a number of very tangible motivating factors have driven the trend toward
privatization. The sale of assets to the private sector has strengthened the financing of the
remaining public sector enterprises as well as filling government coffers. In Malaysia,
privatization has directly benefited UMNO in its continual quest to target funding sources for the
political machine. Though officially UMNO owns no shares in any company, it exercises control
over a vast empire through politically connected allies who own shares and occupy the position
of director in over 100 companies. It is speculated that the total value of shares owned on behalf
of UMNO is approximately US$1.5 billion. The party's property holdings could be worth an
equal amount. UMNO is particularly meticulous about covering its tracks when its business
dealings relate to election fund-raising. Due to the use of corporate nominees and complicated
share swaps such as the recent Renong deal in which the party's corporate assets were
restructured and consolidated raising M$440 million in the process, it is difficult to follow the
trail of corporate maneuvers. UMNO has relied on cashless share swaps since the more desperate
recession days of the mid-1980s as an inexpensive means for raising funds and gaining control
of companies. The Renong deal represents the most complicated and sizeable swap to date and
has resulted in the creation of a conglomerate controlling 8 major publicly listed companies and
50 Tsuruoka, "UMNO's Money Machine", p. 48.
61
a number of private companies. Further maneuvering has led to Renong's recent acquisition of
the hotel and property company the Faber Group, UEM, and TV3. Party supporters claim that
the Renong deal illustrates UMNO's commitment to running its corporate assets more efficiently
and profitably. One source close to UMNO is quoted as saying the Renong restructuring does
the "job of tidying up the party's assets and improving corporate efficiency."5 ' This remains to
be seen, yet it has indisputably provided a valuable source of funds for the party. Opposition
leaders, fearful of UMNO's growing power and their inability to fight a financial powerhouse
at the polls, charge that the party's expanding assets will be used to return the party to power.
Others point to conflict of interest due to the concentration of sensitive assets in the hands of the
leading partner in government.
Indigenous Malay economic ownership remains a sensitive political issue in both Malaysia
and Indonesia. Privatization has been espoused by both governments as a means of boosting the
indigenous economic share, and correcting the imbalance between political and economic
influence. Though the primary players in this process in Indonesia have been Suharto's children,
they still are native pribumi, and as such are raising indigenous economic ownership. Suharto
has stated publicly that his children, as young indigenous entrepreneurs, deserve the chance to
amass the wealth and economic power that has traditionally remained in the hands of the Chinese.
Additionally, his children are training other pribumis in business and providing them with
opportunities. For many, it is difficult to overlook the speculation that nearly 80% of all
51 Ibid, p. 50.
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government projects go in some form or another to Suharto's children or cronies, even if they
are pribumi. This will remain a thorny issue until the sheer size of these conglomerates requires
the hiring of significant numbers of Indonesians outside of the inner palace circle, a trend which
has already begun. If staffing and management continue to progress along rational lines based
on merit, an important and necessary degree of legitimacy will be gained.
The NEP's goal to promote Malay ownership has been closely linked with privatization
measures in Malaysia. The sale of stakes in state-owned companies has enabled the government
to divest ownership to the Bumiputra community within a controlled setting in keeping with the
stated national goals of the NEP. In October of 1990, the Director-General of the government's
Economic Planning Unit said that privatization was part of a national effort to nurture the
country's bumiputra business community and stimulate the supply of capable bumiputra
managers. UMNO's rationale for rapid corporate expansion has rested on the need to expand
Malay ownership, however critics charge the NEP has been exploited by UMNO for its own
personal aggrandizement. Since UMNO's first corporate acquisition in 1972 with the purchase
of the New Straits Times Press, it has moved into an array of businesses spanning all sectors of
the economy from telecommunications, to banking, to construction. The NEP's 30% bumiputra
ownership requirement in privatization projects has provided an ideal means for UMNO leaders
and well-connected Malay businessmen to gain control of valuable corporate assets. Some see
a growing contradiction between the state's supposed goal to decrease its role in the economy and
the increasing business interests of the ruling party. UMNO defenders claim the most important
result is the expansion of Malay economic participation and the growing power they will be able
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to command through access to a common pool of equity. UMNO, in turn, as the perceived
advocate of Malay rights, can depend on a pool of supporters at the polls who will return them
to office.
Just as UMNO has used privatization to aide in its efforts to retain political control and
establish an economic base, Suharto has used privatization to entrench his family's position in
the face of uncertainty over political succession. The looming prospect of political change has
provided an incentive for expansion of the traditional power base out of the palace and into the
marketplace. With the potential decline of the family's political influence, if and when Suharto
retires, the need to establish an independent corporate base outside of the parameters of office
has escalated. Suharto, by assuring his children's continued accumulation of capital, and
development of businesses and industries which make-up indispensable pillars of the economy,
is protecting their position beyond the present political era. During Suharto's remaining time in
office, there is a great need for these family and crony owned conglomerates to prove their
technical and managerial capabilities, and overall economic viability beyond their access to
patronage, to enhance legitimacy in the eyes of a critical public. Though conglomerates such as
Bimantara, Humpuss and Liem Sioe Liong's Salim group achieved their prominent positions
through political patronage and preferential access, their extensive economic holdings have
enabled them to develop an independent capital base which may soon free them from the need
to depend on patronage. The test will be if they can survive and compete in the marketplace
without the benefits of patronage, and conversely, if Suharto remains in power, will they have
to?
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Many Indonesians feel that the still nascent and vulnerable stage of the family's
expanding economic holdings will serve as inducement for Suharto to retain power in the near
future, if only to protect his children.52 A peaceful transition of power, never experienced during
the Republic's history, may be influenced by the kinds of guarantees provided to protect both
family and crony business interests. However, the more rapidly these businesses are able to
establish economic independence, the greater their chances for survival regardless of who is
occupying the presidential palace. Greater transparency on the part of the government toward
privatization, and more regularized implementation of privatization measures involving a wider
spectrum of players will also strengthen the position of these family businesses.
In both Malaysia and Indonesia, the primary political players have actively sought to
lessen their dependence on the state apparatus and create a more autonomous power base to
ensure their livelihood beyond the fluctuations of the political system. With UMNO's and the
Suharto family's expanding role in the economy, it becomes more difficult to simply cast them
aside if and when they fall out of political favor. This entrenchment of political elites as
indispensable players in the accumulation of domestic capital and the ability to spread the fruits
of this growth to a broader societal base, will enhance the long-term viability of those holding
power. In the 1980s and 90s continued economic growth in tandem with decreased formal state
ownership has provided a means for the political elite in Malaysia and Indonesia to strengthen
their power base and augment their position. Privatization has provided an easily manipulated
52 Steven Erlanger, "For Suharto, His Heirs are Key to Life After '93", The New York Times, November 11,
1990, Section L, p. 12.
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means to this end, and a vehicle for initiating the reconstitution of the traditional power base from
the presidential palace to the marketplace.
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